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PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND THEIR EVOLUTION
ARTHUR LINTON CORBINt
The following remarks were delivered by Professor Corbin on Oc-
tober 23, 1954, at a Yale Law School dinner honoring him on his
eightieth birthday.
As the students and faculty of the Yale Law School take part in celebrating
my eightieth anniversary, I should like to state to them, and to others, what is
the most important idea that I have got out of my fifty-seven years of law study.
law teaching, and law practice. It is this: the development of our law-com-
mon, statutory, and constitutional-is a part of the continuing evolutionary
development of life in society. It is this that prevented the teaching of law for
more than forty years from becoming a deadly bore. It is this that has given
to the study of new cases-probably more than 50,000 of them-an interest
that is no less at eighty than it was at twenty-five.
The law that I taught and the law that I wrote were never quite the same
from year to year; and you may be sure that there are remarkable differences
between the law that was taught me prior to 1900 and the law that I taught in
1942 and wrote in 1950. This does not mean that there is not a large core of
similarity. We never escape from history, especially in so short a period as
fifty years; but the longer the period, the less is the similarity. Indeed, some
of the mores of a people, on which our law is founded, persist so long as to
create an illusion of eternity and perfection.
It is this idea of the nature and growth of law that has created a persistent
interest in the output of the courts. Opinions, with an occasional golden nug-
get, are often dull and repetitious of outworn formulas. But they deal with
the continuing life and experience of mankind; and the decision, whether well-
reasoned or merely instinctive, is evidence of the prevailing mores that underly
our ever-growing law.
just how is the law of 1900 different from the law of 1950? Are not legal
principles permanent and eternal? The answer to this is no. Sometimes there
is a complete reversal. What promises are enforceable at law? In earlier times,
only those that were in a writing executed by sealing and delivery or some
other formality. We used to teach that consideration for a promise must be a
"detriment to the promisee." In the Contracts Restatenmient we say that it need
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not be. We once taught that contract required a consensus of minds, a con-
currence of wills, so that an irrevocable offer was a legal impossibility. How
many of the impossibilities of the past are the commonplaces of today.
At one time in the history of this school, some thirty-five years ago, some
of our bright young men had lost faith in all supposed legal principles. No two
cases are alike. How can you generalize from a mass of variable and conflicting
experience? At a luncheon, they posed to me this question: "Do you think
that there is such a thing as a legal principle?" I replied at once, "Certainly I
do," proceeding, however, to explain that it was not something handed down
from on high, not a part of a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." I meant
that there are useful generalizations based on long human experience; that al-
though no two cases are ever exactly alike, there are groups of cases that have
much in common; that by careful and imaginative analysis and comparison of
these cases it is possible to construct general rules, doctrines, principles, which
are of great value in directing and in predicting future human and judicial
action in similar cases. These are tentative, working rules, the value of which
depends upon the industry and the intelligence of the man who makes them,
and upon the changes in time and circumstance since they were made.
The difference between a good lawyer and a poor one, between a great jurist
and a lesser one, lies in the accuracy and completeness and clarity of his under-
standing of past human transactions and in his ability to make sound and useful
generalizations from them. Of course, these human transactions include much
more than merely the litigated cases.
It is a matter of course that the young men and women who have joined in
celebrating my anniversary will not accept my views as to the nature of law
and its evolutionary development merely because they are mine, even though
they are held with conviction at the age of eighty after long years of thought
and observation. Others hold quite different views, others who may be wiser
men. Throughout my teaching career, my efforts were directed at inducing and
compelling my students to acquire a background and a method of analysis that
would enable them to form and to maintain opinions and generalizations of
their own. The judicial opinions and the "great books" of the past are an
essential part of that background, not because one can find the final answer in
any of them, but because they bring us down to date in our groping and un-
certain human progress and because they are the base from which we take the
next step forward.
Not long ago a book by a living philosopher was reviewed in The New York
Times. I have not read the book; but the reviewer, apparently in order to
show the author's disapproval of present-day teaching and opinion, quotes him
as follows: "For the past century, he says, 'the drift of higher teaching, includ-
ing our teaching of the foundations of law, .. . had been pragmatic in the social
utility sense, resting heavily on 'experience' as the chief source of wisdom,
guided largely by theories of evolution in social affairs and by the new social
sciences, and proclaiming relativity in customs, morals, laws as the highly
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flexible principle of judgment for all human culture.' "-I My own life experience
and my study and teaching of the law have forced me to hold substantially the
views that he here describes.
At their first recitation, I have often read my students a passage from a
series of lectures on The Nature of the Judicial Proccss, delivered at Yale by
Benjamin N. Cardozo. That passage is as follows: "I was much troubled in
spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find how trackless was the ocean on
which I had embarked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened
when I found that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land, the
solid land of fixed and settled rules, the paradise of a justice that would declare
itself by tokens plainer and more commanding than its pale and glimmering
reflections in my own vacillating mind and conscience. I found '%ith the voy-
agers of Browning's Paracelsus that the real heaven was always beyond.' As
the years have gone by, and I have reflected more and more upon the nature
of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I
have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its
highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgiv-
ings, the hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death
and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their day expire,
and new principles are born." 2
So you see that legal rules and principles are not to be scorned because they
are tentative, working rules and are subject to change. The greater the jurist
who makes or uses them, the greater will be the modesty with which they are
laid down. Those of lesser wisdom and more self-conceit will state their doc-
trines as absolute and eternal. A law that is composed of tentative, vorking
rules is indeed human law; but it is also natural law-it is as "natural" as rain,
as "natural" as birth and death.
Well-made, such legal rules and principles may have a long and useful life.
They serve the needs and purposes of our daily lives. I know that the ones
that I have helped to make can not remain unchanged. It is the function of a
new generation to make better ones for the new day. The great books and
the old masters have not said the final word; much less have the teachers and
writers of the present day.
You may be sure that as long as the Yale Law School is a place of active
growth, based upon a thorough and respectful knowledge of human life and
experience, and as long as it is a place for free and open and honest minds, its
working force of employees, students, and faculty will have an old man's abid-
ing affection and support during all his remaining years.
1. Chalmers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1954, § 7, p. 20, revieving HocKrx, Ex-zr-maENT
IN EDUCATION: WHAT VE CAN LnARN rnom. T&cHING GERMANY (1954).
2. CARuozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-7 (1921).
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